A Litany of Excellent Research Quotes

From the Kentucky Resolution of 1798
IV. Resolved, that alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the State wherein they are; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual States distinct from their power over citizens; and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” the [Alien Act of June 22, 1798], which assumes power over alien friends not delegated by the Constitution, is not law, but is altogether void and of no force….

A predictive warning of what has eventually happened.
“The idea prevails with some, indeed it has expression in arguments at the bar, that we have in this country substantially two national governments; one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to… I take leave to say that, if the principles thus announced should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system will result. We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism… It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside the Supreme Law of the Land finds lodgment in our Constitutional Jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution.”
Honorable Supreme Court Justice John Harlan in the 1901 case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
“Congress exercises its confirmed powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution. If a state ratifies or gives consent to any authority which is not specifically granted by the Constitution of the United States, it is null and void. State officials cannot consent to the enlargement of powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.”
Sandra Day O’Conner in the 1992 case of New York v. United States NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner in a 1992 decision, in which the Supreme Court was decided the relative Constitutional powers between the Union States and the federal government stated:
“Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157
Furthermore”
State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, the facts of this case raise the possibility that powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Id @ 182

In emphasizing the need for the indestructibility of both the Union of States and the States themselves, Justice O’Conner quoted Chief Justice Chase from an 1860 case “the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869). Id @ 162

Since Justice John Marshal’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) it has become axiomatic, at least in this republic, that “[A]n unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy.” Now, considering that “[t]he Constitution and all its provisions, looks yo an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States,”

See also Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, [505 U.S. 144, 163] 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (“[N]either government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers”); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 461 (“[T]he States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere”).
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the “consent” of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution’s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 -137 (1976), for instance, the Court held that Congress had infringed the President’s appointment power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 842 , n. 12. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 -959 (1983), we held that the legislative veto violated the constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the President, despite Presidents’ approval of hundreds of statutes containing a legislative veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the “consent” of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.
State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, the facts of this case raise the possibility that powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests.

(i) Also rejected is the sited state respondents’ argument that the Act cannot be ruled an unconstitutional infringement of New York sovereignty because officials of that State lent their support, and consented, to the Act’s passage
In Chief Justice Chase’s much-quoted words, “the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869). Nor does New York’s prior support estop it from asserting the Act’s unconstitutionality. Pp. 180-183

The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: “Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the “consent” of state officials

Four considerations for the spending clause:
The spending power is of course not unlimited, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 , and n. 13 (1981), but is instead subject to several general restrictions articulated in our cases. The first of these limitations is derived from the language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.” See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 -641 (1937); United States v. Butler, supra, at 65. In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress. Helvering v. Davis, supra, at 640, 645. 2 Second, we have required that if Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously . . ., enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, supra, at 17. Third, our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.” Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 [483 U.S. 203, 208] (1978) (plurality opinion). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, supra, at 295, (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof”). Finally, we have noted that other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269 -270 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 , n. 34 (1968). SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head.”, Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 36

The (14th) amendment referred to slavery. Consequently, the only persons embraced by its provisions, and for which Congress was authorized to legislate in the manner were those then in slavery.”
Bowlin v. Commonwealth (1867), 65 Kent. Rep. 5, 29.

It is claimed that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and of this state. Undoubtedly she is. It is argued that she became such by force of the first section of the 14th Amendment, already recited. This, however, is a mistake.”  Van Valkenberg v. Brown (1872), 43 Cal. Sup. Ct. 43, 47
“After the adoption of the 13th Amendment, a bill which became the first Civil Rights Act was introduced in the 39th Congress, the major purpose of which was to secure to the recently freed Negroes all the civil rights secured to white men. . . .(N)one other than citizens of the United States were within the provisions of the Act.”
Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, 509.
39.
I.R.S., “The file requirement for 01 is return not required to be mailed or filed.”  U.S. v. Lloyd Long

TITLE 49 > SUBTITLE IV > PART A > CHAPTER 101 > § 10102

§ 10102. Definitions
In this part— (Part A of which 10501 is under)
49 § 10105

8) “State” means a State of the United States and the District of Columbia;

(9) “transportation” includes—
(A) a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and
(B) services related to that movement, including receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, and interchange of passengers and property; and

(10) “United States” means the States of the United States and the District of
Columbia.

“The power of Congress to lay taxes is limited, so that it may not reach the means and instrumentalities of the government of a state; Pollock v. Trust co. 157 U.S.429, or the salaries of state officials, Collector v. Day 11 Wall (U.S.) 113 nor the revenues or interest on bonds of municipal corporations of the states; U.S. V. R. Co. 17 Wall (U.S.) 322

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