Someone has the grass roots Liberty community completely distracted by the snake oil and venom they envision existing in HR875. This Article dispels that notion for those living, farming, and/or purchasing food within any of the 50 Union States as long as they don’t ship their produce to or purchase any food from someone situated within federal territory.
Before we get into HR 875, let us review the Constitutional limitations of Congress’ legative power. In Article I, Section 8, the Constitution lays out specifically just what powers were delegated to Congress by We the People together with the Union States. It should be pointed out here that Congress is made up of the two sovereigns who existed at the time, namely the citizens of the Union States and the Union States themselves. As a protective measure, the 10th Amendment was added to protect the two creating sovereigns. Rather than take a side trip here, Appendix A & B are included at the end of this discussion to substantiate the notion the both Union States and the Citizens thereof are meant to have sovereign status by the founding fathers.
At clause 17 of Section 8, the Constitution grants the power to legislate to Congress with express limitations, stating that:
“Congress shall have the power; … To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square, by Cessation of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the States in which the Same be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings;”
Also, at Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, The Constitution provides additional Legislative power for those territories and properties accumulated by the United States (federal) Government for various other purposes by granting:
“Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as to the Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”
That, dear reader is the sum substance and total power given to Congress to legislate. Although Article I, Section 8 in general defines the total powers of the newly created Federal Government, non, you will notice, provides Congress with the Power to Legislate beyond the limits set forth above. While the other powers granted in Section 8 were related to specific activities and functions relative to the running of the Federal Government, none provides for expansion of the powers set out above to legislate within the sovereign territories of any one or more of the Union States. With a little patience and research, one can discover that most every Title and/or Chapter of federal law has a jurisdictional Section limiting said Title and/or Chapter to the Federal Territory over which Congress was given the power of exclusively Legislate. Such jurisdictional Section is found in the “definitions” section wherein Congress cleverly redefined common terms to mean something completely different than the semantics of the terms as used in the Constitution and everyday speech.
For example, HR875 is a Bill that will find its way into Title 21 and so states in the body of the Bill. Said Bill incorporates the “definitions” found in Title 21 to establish the total meanings and jurisdiction for the enforcement of the various provisions found in the bill.
(a) Findings.-Congress finds that-
(1) the safety of the food supply of the United States is vital to the public health, to public confidence in the food supply, and to the success of the food sector of the Nation’s economy;
(2) lapses in the protection of the food supply and loss of public confidence in food safety are damaging to consumers and the food industry, and place a burden on interstate commerce and international trade
(17) INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-The term “interstate commerce” has the meaning given that term in section 201(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(b)).
(18) MISBRANDED.-The term “misbranded” has the meaning given that term in section 403 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 343).
(19) PROCESS.-The term “process” or “processing” means the commercial slaughter, packing, preparation, or manufacture of food.
(20) STATE.-The term “State” means-
(A) a State;
(C) the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and
(D) any other territory or possession of the United States.
Section 321
For the purposes of this chapter-
(1) The term “State”, except as used in the last sentence of section 372 (a) of this title, means any State or Territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(2) The term “Territory” means any Territory or possession of the United States, including the District of Columbia, and excluding the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone.
(b) The term “interstate commerce” means
(1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof, and
(2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any other Territory not organized with a legislative body.
A couple of things are very apparent here. First, we find a term that is used in the Constitution, namely the term “State,” has been redefined for the purposes of HR 875. Congress is not at liberty to redefine a term used in the Constitution; otherwise, Congress could alter its power anytime it felt like doing so. When we find Congress doing that in a proposed bill or in its enacted legislation that act becomes an early hint that Congress is legislating within the territory over which the federal Constitution gives it the exclusive power to legislate.
In HR875 we find two terms being redefined which also appear in the Constitution, namely “State” and “Interstate commerce.” When we sort out the new meanings Congress has established for HR875, we find that the term “State” only applies to territory within the United States, or in other words, federal territory. “Interstate commerce” is a little more onerous. Here, any commerce undertaken in federal territory is included in the definition of “interstate commerce” as defined as well as any commerce which originates or ends in federal territory. So the only time anyone of the 50 Union State occupants could be involved in “interstate commerce” as defined, would be if the commercial transaction began or ended in one of the 50 Union States and at the same time was terminated or originated in federal territory.
So, do any of the inhabitants of any one of the 50 Union States have to be concerned about HR875? As long as said inhabitants are not involved with commerce originating or terminating in federal territory, the answer is no. Even though carriers such as UPS are interstate carriers, a package picked up by UPS for delivery in say Ohio and delivered to say New Jersey, the transaction is not involved in “interstate commerce” as the term is defined.
Consequently, this author does not conclude that HR875 has any “snake oil” or “venom” affecting farms and food growers within any one of the 50 Union States. In fact, if one were to take the time and patience to investigate the federal statutes, one could find the same circumstances in most of the federal statutes where the jurisdiction of each was limited to the federal territory over which Congress was given exclusive power to legislate therein.
Poor Clyde 2009
Appendix A
Declarations of Individual Sovereignty
“The revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already united for general purposes, and at the same time, providing for more domestic concerns, by states conventions, and other temporary arrangements. From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it: and it was then not an uncommon opinion that the un-appropriated lands, which belonged to the crown, passed, not to the people of the colony or states within those limits they were situated, but to the whole people… ‘We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this constitution.’ Here we see the people acting as the sovereigns of the whole country: and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it was their will that the state governments should be bound, and to which constitutions should be made to conform… It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties of Europe, and particularly in England, existed on feudal principles. That system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the people his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere. That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant, derives all franchises, immunities, and privileges; it is easy to perceive, that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a court of justice, or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint… The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects… and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow-citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty. From the differences existing between feudal sovereignties and governments founded on compacts, it necessarily follows that their respective prerogatives must differ. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here it rests with the people; there the sovereign actually administers the government; here never in a single instance; our governors are agents of the people; and at most stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which the regents of Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their princes have personal powers, dignities and preeminence; our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens. Chief Justice Jay, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 (US) Dall 419, 457, 1 LEd 440, 456 at 454. (emphasis added)
AND
“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to the law, for it is the author of the law, but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts… For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, at the mere will of another, seems intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Sheriff, 118 US. 356 (1886) (emphasis added)
Appendix B
Territorial Jurisdiction
On May 28th, 2002, the Supreme Court in its decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas in Federal Marine Commission (FMC) v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002), pointed out that “[d]ual sovereignty is a defining feature of our nation’s constitutional blueprint.” The “dual sovereignty” to which Justice Thomas and the Supreme Court were referring was the sovereignty of each of the fifty (50) States of the Union (Union States) together with the sovereignty of the United States, more typically referred to as the federal government. While the lead into this discussion touches on the dual sovereignty between the people and their respective State and federal governments, the author concentrates primarily on the dominions of the dual sovereignty between the States and the federal government as it relates to the federal government’s Constitutional authority/power for Congress to legislate federal laws for acts or conduct exercised within the territorial boundaries of anyone of the several fifty (50) States of the Union.
This analysis shows the Constitutional genesis of the concept of dual sovereignty and how each (federal or State) derives its authority/power to prosecute crimes as well as when and where such power(s) prevails. As an aside, see Appendix B above as it relates to the ultimate sovereignty, namely that of the human individuals of this Republic.
Consequently, one of the main objectives at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was to provide the newly created United States with the necessary vehicle to enforce the powers granted to it. The Framers, after much debate and trepidation from the States convinced the Convention Delegates that the only means by which the newly created entity, the United States, could execute the powers delegated to it was to provide it with its own sovereignty. See The Federalists Papers, Essay _# 43, written by James Madison.
This sovereignty of the United States was established through Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, which Lopez[1] characterized as the “Constitutionally mandated division of authority.” This “division of authority” uniquely created, in fact, a dual but mutually exclusive sovereignty in the United States of America; one being that of the United States and the other (albeit 50 in number) being that of each of the States of the Union.
Since each organ governmental sovereign has constitutionally delegated powers, the fundamental first principle question is what is the scope and sphere of said delegated powers? The answer is that each is sovereign within the boundary(s) of its assigned and/or acquired territory(s); the United States being sovereign over all territory ceded to it by the States and the States remaining sovereign over their own territory “as to all powers reserved.”
“Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Da11 (U.S.) 419, 435, 1 LEd. 440 (1793) Iredell, J. (Emphasis added)
The conduit through which all constitutionally delegated powers flow is jurisdiction. As to what jurisdiction remained with the States, the Supreme Court asked and answered the question:
“What then, is the extent of jurisdiction which a state possesses? We answer, without hesitation; the jurisdiction is co-extensive with its territory; co-extensive with its legislative [sovereign] power.” United States v. Baevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 336, 386, 387.
Since the sphere and scope of the delegated powers for each is co-extensive with the jurisdiction of its legislature, coextensive with its territory, it remains to be shown just what basis one uses to determine such jurisdiction as a first principle issue of Constitutional law. The whole concept of dual but mutually exclusive jurisdictions between the United States and the States of the Union was further ratified by an Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States, convened in 1957, and chaired by the then Assistant Attorney General, Mansfield D. Sprague during the Eisenhower administration. The Committee published the text of their findings and recommendations in two volumes, the first designated as Part I, The Facts and Committee Recommendations and the second as Part II, A Text of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction. It is in Part II that the Committee ratifies the concept of dual but separate sovereignties,” to wit:
“The Constitution gives express recognition to but one means of Federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction – by State consent under Article I, section 8, Clause 17 …. Justice McLean suggested that the Constitution provided the sole mode of jurisdiction and that if this mode is not pursued, no transfer of jurisdiction can take place. Id @ 41
“It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no Legislative jurisdiction over any area within the State, -such jurisdiction being for the exercise by the State, subject to non-interference by the State with Federal functions. Id @45(emphasis added)
“The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within the exterior boundaries of a State. Id @46 (emphasis added)
“On the other hand, while the Federal Government has power under various provisions of the Constitution to define, and prohibit as criminal, certain acts or omissions occurring anywhere in the United States [of America], it has no power to punish for various crimes [such as drugs and firearms], jurisdiction over which is retained by the States under our Federal-State system of government, unless such crime occurs in areas as to which legislative jurisdiction has been vested in the Federal Government.’ Id @ 107. (Insertions added by the author)
The last paragraph of the Committee’s findings parallels exactly what Thomas Jefferson had to say opposing the “Sedition Act” when he wrote The Kentucky Resolutions addressing Congress’ authority to punish such crimes, to wit:
“2. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States, having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, and no other crimes whatsoever …. ” (emphasis added)
In the context of the Dual Sovereignty what then is the Constitutional jurisdictional relationship between a Union State and the federal government, known as the United States, in federal legislation.
“The United States Government is a Foreign Corporation with respect to a State.” 19 Corpus Jurus Secundum §884, In re: Marriam’s Estate, 36 N.Y. 505, 141 N.Y. 479, Affirmed in United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625
Consequently, if the United States Government is a Foreign Corporation with respect to a State, it follows, conversely, that a State is foreign with respect to the United States Government. Since the United States Government’s legislation has no authority in a foreign land, it therefore has no authority in a State which is foreign to the United States Government.
With respect to taxing statutes defined by Congress at 26 USC, Chapter 21, §3101 – 3121, the first presumption is that Congress is legislating within its own territory over which it was granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
“‘All legislation is prima facie territorial.’ Ex Parte Blain, L.R. 12 Ch Div 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499; People v. Merril, 2 Park Crim. Rep. 590, 596.”
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.347 (1909) (emphasis added)
Additionally, it is well settled that all legislation of Congress is presumed to be territorial unless a contrary intent appears in the Act(s).
“We thus apply ‘[t]he canon of construction which teaches that legislation [acts] of Congress; unless contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 93 L.Ed 689, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949); See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25,32 (1982)” Argentine Republic v. American Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)
Therefore, when federal statutes fall to show any intent that said statutes apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the federal government and its agents accordingly fail to possess the required authority enforce such statues and are thus Constitutionally prohibited from doing so. In point of fact, Congress explicitly passed a law articulating such.
Title 40, Section 3112. Federal jurisdiction
(a) Exclusive Jurisdiction Not Required. - It is not required that the Federal Government obtain exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over land or an interest in land it acquires.
(b) Acquisition and Acceptance of Jurisdiction. - When the head of a department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government, or other authorized officer of the department, agency, or independent establishment, considers it desirable, that individual may accept or secure, from the State in which land or an interest in land that is under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of the individual is situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over the land or interest not previously obtained. The individual shall indicate acceptance of jurisdiction on behalf of the Government by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor of the State or in another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is situated.
(c) Presumption. - It is conclusively presumed that jurisdiction has not been accepted until the Government accepts jurisdiction over land as provided in this section.