This is an indepth study of the limits of Federal juridiction and how Union State sovereignty and power is coexistent with the territory of the Union State. This will be new news to most.
THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY OF AMERICA
AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION
PREFACE
On May 28th, 2002, the Supreme Court in its decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas in Federal Marine Commission (FMC) v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002), pointed out that “[d]ual sovereignty is a defining feature of our nation’s constitutional blueprint.” The “dual sovereignty” to which Justice Thomas and the Supreme Court were referring was the sovereignty of each of the fifty (50) States of the Union together with the sovereignty of the United States, more typically referred to as the federal government. While the lead into this discussion touches on the dual sovereignty between the people and their respective State and federal governments, the author concentrates primarily on the dominions of the dual sovereignty between the States and the federal government as it relates to the federal government’s Constitutional authority/power to prosecute offenses against federal laws for acts or conduct committed within the territorial boundaries of anyone of the several fifty (50) States of the Union.
The following analysis of the federal/State dual sovereignty isolates eight (8) distinct areas of law relating directly to the topic.
- Territorial Jurisdiction Shows the Constitutional genesis of the concept of dual sovereignty and how each (federal or State) derives its authority/power to prosecute crimes as well as when and where such power(s) prevails.
II. Original v. Subject Matter/Territorial Jurisdiction. Here the author dispels the myth espoused by various actors in the federal government that the statute that grants the federal district courts with original jurisdiction also grants the federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction. The two are by no means the same animal.
III. Territorial Tribunals The Supreme Court has ruled that the United States District Courts are Article I, territorial Tribunals and as such can only take cognizance of offenses and affairs occurring within the territory over which Congress was Constitutionally granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction by Article !, Section 8, Clause 17 and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2.
IV. The Gate Keeping Affects of Rule 54. Here it is pointed out that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP), promulgated by the Supreme Court and approved by Congress, in Rule 54 completely confines the United States District Court’s jurisdiction to only those federal offenses occurring within the territory over which Congress was Constitutionally granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Also, congress gave Rule 54 together with all other FRCrP Rules with supersession authority, making all laws in conflict with said rules to be of no further legal effect in 28 USC 2072(b).
- Interstate Commerce. The Constitution granted Congress with extraterritorial powers to regulate commerce between the several States, commonly referred to as “interstate commerce,” and was the primary vehicle used by the “New Deal” judiciary to greatly expand the scope and nature of federal powers. However, Congress has since curtailed such expansion by various government actors by redefining the term “interstate commerce” to include only that commerce which occurs between states within the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction, such as Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands, etc. Such redefinition reigns in the jurisprudence to prosecute offenses under Congress’ extraterritorial powers to regulate interstate commerce to be entirely consistent with Rule 54, in that only acts or conduct associated with commerce occurring within the territory over which Congress possesses exclusive jurisdiction are cognizable in the federal courts.
- Persons Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 773 articulates that “[p]ersons are the substance of which rights and duties are the attributes.” Rights and duties flow from contracts. Contracts are the genesis of artificial entities whose names or monikers are presented in all capital letters. Also, the statutory definition of the term person” includes only artificial entities. This coupled with the fact that the defendant’s name is presented in all capital letters on the indictment leads one to conclude that the charges on the indictment are levied on some artificial entity. However, the record is generally void of any contractual nexus between such artificial entity/person and the human being who has been arrested and imprisoned.
VII Principal of Interest Indictments are brought, in the name of the United States of America but the Constitution created the entity “United States“ and delegated to it certain powers and authorities. There exists no evidence in the Constitution or the statutes of the United States which defines just who or what the United States of America really is. Absent any contract or agreement with the defendant, the United States of America is unable, as a matter of law, to state any claim upon which relief can be granted.
VIII. Original Understanding The federal judiciary was given life tenure and undiminished salaries as a means to establish its independence from any political influences whatsoever. Also, the federal judiciary takes an oath of office to uphold the Constitution, not stare decisis when stare decisis would seem to conflict with the original understanding of the Framers of the Constitution and those who ratified it. The original understanding of the Constitution also includes the concept that the people were themselves each sovereign over their own lives and the agents of government were accordingly their servants. Anything contrary to such original understanding, including the political and judicial travesty of justice called the New Deal, has no place in the jurisprudence of this nation and its independent and sovereign States.
Conclusion The Supreme Court on May 28th, 2002, ratified the concept of a dual sovereignty, herein espoused, by stating that “[dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our nation's constitutional blueprint." It doesn't get any plainer than that! Until the representatives or the agents for the federal government can point to the specific facts in the record that grant the United States of America with the authority/jurisdiction to prosecute acts and/or conduct committed by a defendant within the territorial boundaries of anyone of the fifty (50) States of the Union in a United States District Court, no such jurisdiction exists and all such prosecutions and judgments are void as a matter of law.
MOST FEDERAL INDICTMENTS FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THUS FAIL TO ESTABLISH FEDERAL JURISDICTION FOR A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION
Probably the best place to start this discussion is Justice Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 131 LEd. 2d 626, 115 S.Ct. 1624, wherein the Court set the stage for an analysis of all Federal powers; i.e., powers granted by the Constitution to the newly created United States, to wit:
"We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See Art. 1, §8. As James Madison wrote: 'The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.' The Federalist No. 45, pp 292-293 "(C. Rossiter ed, 1961). This Constitutionally mandated division of authority 'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.' Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111 LEd.2d 410, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)" Ibid at 552 (emphasis added)
However, from 1776 till the Constitution was ratified by the States in 1789, displacing the Articles of Confederation, there was no "Constitutionally mandated division of authority." While there was an attempt at a division of authority in the Articles of Confederation, many of the statesmen of the time realized that the authority delegated in said Articles was without teeth because all sovereignty, power, freedom, independence, and jurisdiction was retained by the States. Article II so stated:
"Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.” Articles of Confederation, (1787).
Consequently, one of the main objectives at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was to provide the newly created United States with the necessary vehicle to enforce the powers granted to it. The Framers, after much debate and trepidation from the States convinced the Convention Delegates that the only means by which the newly created entity, the United States, could execute the powers delegated to it was to provide it with its own sovereignty. See The Federalists Papers, Essay _# 43, written by James Madison.
This sovereignty of the United States was established through Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, which Lopez characterized as the "Constitutionally mandated division of authority." This "division of authority" uniquely created, in fact, a dual but mutually exclusive sovereignty in the United States of America; one being that of the United States and the other (albeit 50 in number) being that of each of the States of the Union.
I - Territorial Jurisdiction
On May 28th, 2002, the Supreme Court in its decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas in Federal Marine Commission (FMC) v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002), pointed out that "[d]ual sovereignty is a defining feature of our nation’s constitutional blueprint.” The “dual sovereignty” to which Justice Thomas and the Supreme Court were referring was the sovereignty of each of the fifty (50) States of the Union (Union States) together with the sovereignty of the United States, more typically referred to as the federal government. We concentrate here upon the dominions of the dual sovereignty between the States and the federal government as it relates to the federal government’s Constitutional authority/power for Congress to legislate federal laws for acts or conduct exercised within the territorial boundaries of anyone of the several fifty (50) States of the Union.
Probably the paramount statement by Justice Thomas relative to the sovereignty of anyone of the Union States is exemplified in the following quote from his opinion in FMC case referenced above:
Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation’s constitutional blueprint. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991). States, upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal Government. Rather, they entered the Union “with their sovereignty intact.” Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991). An integral component of that “residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison), retained by the States is their immunity from private suits. Reflecting the widespread understanding at the time the Constitution was drafted, Alexander Hamilton explained,
”It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State of the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States … .” Id., No. 81, at 487-488 (emphasis in original).
States, in ratifying the Constitution, did surrender a portion of their inherent immunity by consenting to suits brought by sister States or by the Federal Government. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 755 (1999). Nevertheless, the Convention did not disturb States’ immunity from private suits, thus firmly enshrining this principle in our constitutional framework. “The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the people in no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of sovereign immunity.” Id., at 716. (emphasis added)
This analysis shows the Constitutional genesis of the concept of dual sovereignty and how each (federal or Union State government) derives its legislative power when and where such power(s) prevails. As an aside, see Appendix B above as it relates to the ultimate sovereignty, namely that of the human individuals of this Republic.
Consequently, one of the main objectives at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was to provide the newly created United States with the necessary vehicle to enforce the powers granted to it. The Framers, after much debate and trepidation from the States convinced the Convention Delegates that the only means by which the newly created entity, the United States, could execute the powers delegated to it was to provide it with its own sovereignty. See The Federalists Papers, Essay _# 43, written by James Madison.
This sovereignty of the United States was established through Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, which Lopez characterized as the “Constitutionally mandated division of authority.” This “division of authority” uniquely created, in fact, a dual but mutually exclusive sovereignty in the United States of America; one being that of the United States and the other (albeit 50 in number) being that of each of the States of the Union.
Since each governmental sovereign organ has constitutionally delegated powers, the fundamental first principle question is what is the scope and sphere of said delegated powers? The answer is that each is sovereign within the boundary(s) of its assigned and/or acquired territory(s); the United States being sovereign over all territory ceded to it by the States and the States remaining sovereign over their own territory “as to all powers reserved.”
“Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Da11 (U.S.) 419, 435, 1 LEd. 440 (1793) Iredell, J. (Emphasis added)
The conduit through which all constitutionally delegated powers flow is jurisdiction. As to what jurisdiction remained with the States, the Supreme Court asked and answered the question:
“What then, is the extent of jurisdiction which a state possesses? We answer, without hesitation; the jurisdiction is co-extensive with its territory; co-extensive with its legislative [sovereign] power.” United States v. Baevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 336, 386, 387.
Since the sphere and scope of the delegated powers for each is co-extensive with the jurisdiction of its legislature, coextensive with its territory, it remains to be shown just what basis one uses to determine such jurisdiction as a first principle issue of Constitutional law. The whole concept of dual but mutually exclusive jurisdictions between the United States and the States of the Union was further ratified by an Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States, convened in 1957, and chaired by the then Assistant Attorney General, Mansfield D. Sprague during the Eisenhower administration. The Committee published the text of their findings and recommendations in two volumes, the first designated as Part I, The Facts and Committee Recommendations and the second as Part II, A Text of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction. It is in Part II that the Committee ratifies the concept of dual but separate sovereignties,” to wit:
“The Constitution gives express recognition to but one means of Federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction – by State consent under Article I, section 8, Clause 17 …. Justice McLean suggested that the Constitution provided the sole mode of jurisdiction and that if this mode is not pursued, no transfer of jurisdiction can take place. Id @ 41
“It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no Legislative jurisdiction over any area within the State, -such jurisdiction being for the exercise by the State, subject to non-interference by the State with Federal functions. Id @45(emphasis added)
“The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within the exterior boundaries of a State. Id @46 (emphasis added)
“On the other hand, while the Federal Government has power under various provisions of the Constitution to define, and prohibit as criminal, certain acts or omissions occurring anywhere in the United States [of America], it has no power to punish for various crimes [such as drugs and firearms], jurisdiction over which is retained by the States under our Federal-State system of government, unless such crime occurs in areas as to which legislative jurisdiction has been vested in the Federal Government.’ Id @ 107. (Insertions added by the author)
The last paragraph of the Committee’s findings parallels exactly what Thomas Jefferson had to say opposing the “Sedition Act” when he wrote The Kentucky Resolutions addressing Congress’ authority to punish such crimes, to wit:
“2. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States, having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, and no other crimes whatsoever …. ” (emphasis added)
In the context of the Dual Sovereignty what then is the Constitutional jurisdictional relationship between a Union State and the federal government, known as the United States, in federal legislation.
“The United States Government is a Foreign Corporation with respect to a State.” 19 Corpus Jurus Secundum §884, In re: Marriam’s Estate, 36 N.Y. 505, 141 N.Y. 479, Affirmed in United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625
Consequently, if the United States Government is a Foreign Corporation with respect to a State, it follows, conversely, that a State is foreign with respect to the United States Government. Since the United States Government’s legislation has no authority in a foreign land, it therefore has no authority in a State which is foreign to the United States Government.
With respect to taxing statutes defined by Congress at 26 USC, Chapter 21, §3101 – 3121, the first presumption is that Congress is legislating within its own territory over which it was granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
“‘All legislation is prima facie territorial.’ Ex Parte Blain, L.R. 12 Ch Div 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499; People v. Merril, 2 Park Crim. Rep. 590, 596.”
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.347 (1909) (emphasis added)
Additionally, it is well settled that all legislation of Congress is presumed to be territorial unless a contrary intent appears in the Act(s).
“We thus apply ‘[t]he canon of construction which teaches that legislation [acts] of Congress; unless contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 93 L.Ed 689, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949); See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25,32 (1982)” Argentine Republic v. American Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)
Therefore, when federal statutes fall to show any intent that said statutes apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the federal government and its agents accordingly fail to possess the required authority enforce such statues and are thus Constitutionally prohibited from doing so. In point of fact, Congress explicitly passed a law articulating such.
Title 40, Section 3112. Federal jurisdiction
(a) Exclusive Jurisdiction Not Required. - It is not required that the Federal Government obtain exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over land or an interest in land it acquires.
(b) Acquisition and Acceptance of Jurisdiction. - When the head of a department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government, or other authorized officer of the department, agency, or independent establishment, considers it desirable, that individual may accept or secure, from the State in which land or an interest in land that is under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of the individual is situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over the land or interest not previously obtained. The individual shall indicate acceptance of jurisdiction on behalf of the Government by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor of the State or in another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is situated.
(c) Presumption. - It is conclusively presumed that jurisdiction has not been accepted until the Government accepts jurisdiction over land as provided in this section.
II – ORIGINAL V. SUBJECT MATTER/TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
U.S. Attorneys like to argue that 18 usc 3231 provides the United States District Courts with “subject matter jurisdiction” over all criminal causes of action before it, but a simple reading of the statute and the definition of terms proves otherwise.
“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
Nothing in this title [18 USC §§ 1 et seg.] shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several states under the laws thereof.” 18 USC 3231 (emphasis added)
Notwithstanding the fact that the district courts of the United States, as set out in 18 USC 3231, are not the same courts as the United States District Courts, as argued below, and notwithstanding the fact that the principal of interest is usually designated as the “United States of America” and not the United States, as set out in 18 USC 3231, also argued below, the simple fact of the matter is that 18 USC §3231 only grants the district courts of the United States with original jurisdiction once federal subject matter jurisdiction has been established.
Adapting the definition of the United States legislated at 18 USC §5;
“The term “United States,” as used in this title [18 USC §§1 et seg.] in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States except the Canal Zone. ‘
18 USC §5 (emphasis added);
it is first semantically obvious that section 3231 is a grant of original jurisdiction for offenses against the laws of the United States only in those areas which are “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Such areas are set out, in toto, at 18 USC §7 and are what Congress has defined as the area “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
“Original jurisdiction” of a court simply means the court in which any cause of action is first litigated as opposed to a court which possesses appellate or supervisory jurisdiction, once the matter is determined to be a matter over which the court and its legislature has the lawful power to adjudicate. Black’s Law Dictionary aptly depicts the delineation between “original jurisdiction” and “subject matter jurisdiction.”
“Original jurisdiction – A court’s power to hear and decide a matter before any other court can review the matter. Cf. “appellate jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. p.899
(emphasis added)
“Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or status of the things.” _I_d. at p. 857 (emphasis added)
The “nature of the case” (i.e. subject matter) in the case of a federal court could be due to its power to adjudicate either the laws of Congress under its power to exclusively legislate within the sovereign territory (territorial jurisdiction) of the United States or one of Congress’ enumerated powers set out in the Constitution. But it is well settled that the federal courts do not have a general jurisdiction, they are known to have only “limited jurisdiction.”
“Limited Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction that is confined to a particular type of case or that may be exercised only under statutory limits and prescriptions – also termed special jurisdiction. Cf. general jurisdiction.
‘It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts … cannot be courts of general jurisdiction. They are empowered to hear only such cases as are within the judicial power of the United States as defined in the Constitution, and have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Congress.’ Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal courts §7 at 27 (5th ed. 1994)” Black’s, supra. at p. 856
Consequently, from the above it is semantically obvious that just because 18 USC §3231 grants the district courts with original jurisdiction does not grant or establish the district court’s jurisdiction over the “nature of the case,” which, of course, is the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether territorial or a Constitutionally enumerated power.
At the risk of beating a dead horse, it should be pointed out that the phrase “exclusive “of the States,” means exclusive of the States within the federal government’s sovereign territory over which Congress was granted the power of exclusive legislative authority. However, the use of the phrase “the several states” in the second sentence of 18 USC §3231 establishes that the district courts of the United States are barred from taking away or impairing the jurisdiction of the courts of the 50 States under the laws of their respective legislatures.
III – TERRITORIAL TRIBUNALS
When a private human being is tried and convicted it must be noted that::
“The United States District Court is not a true United States Court established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial powers of the United States therein conveyed. It is created in virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under article 4, §3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to non residence of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court. Balzac v. Puerto Ric0, 258 U.S. 298, 312, 66 L.Ed. 627, 42 S.Ct. 343 (1922)
The above Supreme Court ruling posits an extremely important question. Where in the huge body of Congressional legislation did Congress grant the United States District Courts with the power (jurisdiction) to charge, try, accept guilty pleas from, convict, and sentence unenfranchised human beings for acts or conduct committed outside Congress’ sovereign territory, namely within the sovereign territory of anyone of the 50 States over which Congress has no Constitutional power to punish? The answer is, nowhere.
As shown above, 18 USC §3231 granted “original jurisdiction” to the “district courts of the United States,” not the “United States District Courts.” Furthermore, the definition for “Courts” at 28 USC §610 lists only the following, to wit:
“As used in this chapter the word “courts” includes the courts of appeals and the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the Marianna Islands, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade.” 28 USC §610
Except for the United States District Court of the Northern Marianna Islands, there is no “United States District Court” listed in 28 USC §610. This is further verified by 4 CFR §91.2 where it reiterates the 28 USC §610 definition. So what is a “United States District Court?”
“A United States District Court is an inferior court, i.e., inferior to the United States Supreme Court. The District Court is a tribunal created by Congress under the power given to Congress by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 9, of the United States Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have power ‘to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.’ Romero v. International Terminal 0reratiOng Co., 358 U.S. 354, 3 LEd.2d 368, 79 S.Ct. 468 1959J. The creation and composition of the United States District Courts is presently set forth in Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 132. A United States District Court has only such jurisdiction as the Congress confers upon the Court .. ” Eastern Metals Corporation v. Martin, 191 F.Supp 245 (1960)
Thus, the United States District Courts are territorial Tribunals to operate exclusively within the sovereign territory over which congress was granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction and are therefore not Article III Courts of the United States. This is entirely consistent with Rule 54, F.R.Cr.P., wherein, it states:- “Courts – These rules apply to all criminal ‘proceedings in the United· States District Courts …. ” As argued below, Rule 54 is the “gate keeper” which confines (by not granting otherwise) the prosecution of any “Act of Congress” to only the territory over which Congress was granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
Then it follows that any natural human being found guilty of violating a federal statute for acts occurring within the exclusive territory of anyone of the several 50 states of the Union was unlawfully prosecuted for acts or conduct occurring outside Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction in a territorial Tribunal.
“If we look at the place of its operation, we find it to be within the territory, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of New York [or anyone of the other 50 States]. If we look at the person on whom it operates, he is found within the same territory and jurisdiction.” New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11Pet) 102, 133 (1837)
To make matters even worse, the offices of the U.S. Attorneys are offices attached to the seat of government and therefore pursuant to 4 USC 72 are prohibited from exercising their offices outside the District of Columbia “except as otherwise expressly provided by law.” u.s. Attorneys are without any authority to convene or seek an indictment from a grand jury sitting in a territorial Tribunal for acts or conduct committed by natural persons in the sovereign territory of anyone of the 50 States, nor do they have any legislated authority to prosecute any person for said acts or conduct. The same is true for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Consequently, anyone arrested by anyone from said agencies, such arrests are unlawful because there exists no legislated authority to commence an action or make arrests within the sovereign territory of anyone of the 50 States.
It may be that any one of the 50 States has entered into some extra Constitutional arrangement with the United States or the United States of America which is unknown to the public at large, but is known to the Courts and other law professionals that the territorial jurisdiction of Congress was extended to include the sovereign territory of any one of the 50 States, thereby creating a defacto state within the dejure State of any one of the 50 States. However, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 strictly prohibits such a concept.
“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of another state ….” U.S. Constitution Article IV, Sec. , C
While the government may be poised to suggest that criminal cases, because of the bankruptcy of the United States are being prosecuted under admiralty law, territorial Tribunals do not have the ·power, it will be noted, to adjudicate admiralty matters in the territorial courts within the sovereign territory of anyone of the 50 States. Only, Article III courts have such jurisdiction.
“Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories, and Congress may vest admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by a territorial legislature as well as in territorial courts created by act of Congress, and it has exercised this power in both instances. [In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472; The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453; American Ins. Co. v.
356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828)J" Vol. 1 Corpus Juris, 1914 eg, §11, p. 1251
Consequently, as a territorial court, the United States District Court has no Constitutional authority to charge, try, convict, and sentence anyone under the laws of admiralty for acts or conduct committed within the sovereign territory of anyone of the 50 States.
Accordingly, when one is tried, convicted, and sentenced in a territorial Tribunal with no Constitutional authority to adjudicate any claims against an individual for acts or conduct occurring within the sovereign soil of one of the 50 States, and since the U.S. Attorney likewise is without any Constitutionally legislated authority to prosecute such an individual for any such acts or conduct occurring within the sovereign soil of anyone of the 50 States, and since armed DEA agents are likewise without any Constitutionally legislated authority to arrest or restrain any such person, such a person would be unconstitutionally incarcerated. Thus such an incarcerated person would be a victim of false imprisonment in its most cynical and despotic political form.
Therefore, the prosecuting Court would be obligated under the Constitution to perform its Article III duty and grant the prisoner a Writ of error, returning him to his natural and inalienable right to Liberty.
IV - RULE 54 AS TERRITORIAL GATE KEEPER
As pointed out by Justice Marshal in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat (U.S.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed 37, 46:
"The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps, not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, not in the judicial department." United States v. Boston & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 160, 85 S.Ct. 868, 870, 13 L.Ed.2d 728 (1965) and United States v. A&P Trucking, 358 U.s. 121, 127, 3 L.ED.2d 165, 78 S.Ct. 203 (1958); also quoted in United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir 1985)
Taking this into account, it would appear that when Congress gave the Supreme Court the power, pursuant to 28 USC §2072(a), to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States District Courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof), Congress also gave the Supreme Court the power to repeal all legislation contrary to said rules, pursuant to 28 USC 2072(b), to wit:
"(b) Such Rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantial right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) (Emphasis added)
From a simple reading of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it will be obvious that the Supreme Court has repealed all legislation which is to be litigated in the United States District Courts for any and all acts or conduct occurring out side the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction, hence the moniker "gate keeper" as herein assigned.
"Rule 54. Application and exception.
(a) Courts. These rules apply to all criminal proceedings in the United States District Courts.... "
(emphasis added)
(c) Application of terms. As used in these rules, the following terms have their designated meanings. --emphasis added
'Act of Congress' includes any Act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession. (emphasis added)
'State' includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possessions.
'Law' includes statutes and judicial decisions."
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 54.
From a reading of Rule 54, several things come to light as self evident conclusions from the rules themselves. First, the rules apply to all criminal proceedings in the territorial Tribunals, the United States District Courts. Second, the only legislation, "acts of Congress," recognized by the F.R.Cr.P. to be prosecutable in said territorial Tribunals are those acts which have application within the territory over which Congress possess exclusive territorial jurisdiction. This, by the way, puts Rule 54 entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Balzac, set out in III above. Third, the term "State" is limited for all criminal prosecutions to the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. And fourth, Congress has legislated that all laws (which includes statutes and judicial decisions as per F.R.Cr.P. 54(c) in conflict with the Supreme Court's rules "shall have no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." Notice that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), that F.R.Cr.P. also invalidate all judicial decisions, stare decisis, which are in conflict with said rules.
While the idea that the F.R.Cr.P. trump legislation, "acts of Congress," or judicial decisions may raise doubts in the minds of some, the idea that such was the intent of both Congress and the Supreme Court is reflected explicitly in the Commentary by David D. Seigal on the 1988 and 1990 Revisions of Rule 54 on page 534 of Title 28, section 2072 (USCA 1996), to wit:
"the Second sentence of the new subdivision (b) of §2072 ·was a key player in the 1988 act. It's the famous supersession clause, purporting to subordinate all "laws," including Acts of Congress, to the rules promulgated under subdivision (a)." (emphasis added)
Under the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, including the Rule governing their effects, there can be no remaining doubt that Rule 54 under authority of 28 U.S.C. §2072 limits all criminal proceedings in the United States District Courts to alleged criminal offenses committed in the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Such territory being explicitly set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 5. Thus, conclusively proving that the United States District Courts are in fact and in law strictly territorial Tribunals which have limited jurisdiction over only those acts or conduct occurring within the United States territorial jurisdiction as argued in III above. To posit otherwise is to suggest that linguistics have no application in law and that we are being ruled by men, not law.
Since the above set out portions of Rule 54 have been in effect since 1944, anyone charged in federal court for acts or activity occurring in any one of the 50 States has been forced to answer charges which have no force and effect in the United States District Courts. This is so because of Congressional legislation and the rules promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, two branches of the federal government have spoken against the Executive branch exercising any authority outside the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Are we witnessing the executive branch together with the United States District Courts ignoring the dictates of the Supreme Court and Congress and thus reducing the country to the rule of man and not law? After all, this isn’t rocket science.
V - INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Prior to any discussion relative to "interstate commerce," it needs to be said that when Congress, in its legislation, elects to redefine a term used in the Constitution, such as "State," "United States," "interstate commerce," etc., it does so only within its power of exclusive legislative jurisdiction within its own sovereign territory. To postulate otherwise would be to absurdly suggest that Congress could legislate itself unlimited power by simply redefining terms used in the Constitution.
For example, the term "State" when used in the Constitution means one thing and one thing only, and that one thing is a State of the Union of States, now numbering fifty (50). As .aforesaid, a State of the Union enjoys a dual sovereign relationship with the United States, akin to a peer relationship. A "State of the United States" by its own terms (discussed below) has a subject relationship to the United States and exists within the territorial boundaries of the United States over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Remembering that the States of the Union assembled at Philadelphia to create the United States by Constitutional contract, it would be a logical and legal impossibility and a linguistic absurdity to suggest .that one of the States of the Union as one of the creators of the United States could be a subject of its own creation, the United States.
The key to much of Congress' legislation is its redefinition of the term "State." The term "State" is redefined in federal statutes in some 800 places, 55 statutes in Title 18 alone. Since some of those redefinitions include the phrase "State of the United States," it is imperative that such phrase be understood as a matter of law. By examining Congress' redefinition of the terms "United States" and State" together, it can be easily understood just what Congress intended the phrase "State of the United States" to mean.
At 21 USC §802(28), Congress redefined the United States for all offenses in Title 21, Chapter 13; to wit:
"The term 'United States,' when used in a geographic ([territorial) sense, means all places and waters, continental and insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 21 U.S.C. §8 2(28). (emphasis added)
Removing the surplusage from the above redefinition, it takes on the more simple form:
"The term 'United States' includes all territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
i
We know, of course, that the phrase "territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is semantically equivalent to the phrase "territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction." Therefore, a semantically accurate rephrased redefinition of the "United States" at 21 U.S.C. §802(26) in Constitutional terms becomes:
"The term 'United States' includes all territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction."
Thus the phrase "State of the United States" in actual fact means "State of the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction."
Now turning to the redefinition of the term "State" as set out at 21 U.S.C. §802(26), to wit:
"The term 'State' means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States."
Substituting the meaning of the United States in the above redefinition of the term "State," it becomes :
"The term 'State' means a State of the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction."
Consequently, unless Congress' redefinition of the term "State" explicitly includes "the several States," or "the 50 States," or the "States of the Union," such redefinition excludes the 50 States of the Union and only includes those entities therein specifically defined.
"It is the canon of statutory construction that the inclusion of certain provisions implies the exclusion of others. The doctrine inclusio unius est exclusio alterius 'informs "the court to exclude from operation those items not included in a list of elements that are given effect expressly by the statutory language.' In re TMI, 67 F3d 1119, 1123
(3rd Cir 1995)(Quoting Williams v. Wohlegemuth.540 F2d 163, 169 (3rd Cir 1976)" United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F3d 105, 108 (3rd Cir 1996)
Terms such as the "several States" and "States of the Union" are terms or phrases used in the Constitution and would thus be presumed to refer to the fifty (50) States, except that the phrase "the several States of the United States," while at best ambiguous, cannot refer to the 50 States of the Union because of the exact same reason that the phrase the "States of the United States" does not. As aforesaid, the "States of the United States" exist only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States regardless of whether they are referred to as the "several States of the United States," "the States of the United States," or "any State of the United States."
Title 21, section 801 suggests that one should presume that Congress was calling on its "power to regulate interstate commerce" when it enacted Chapter 13 offenses. But upon closer scrutiny it is easy to see that such is not the case.
First, Congress admits at 21 USC §801(5) that it lacked the capacity to call on its commerce clause power when enacting the drug laws by declaring:
"[I]t is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of control [legislation], between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate.” 21 U.S.C. §801(S) (emphasis added)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 54 notwithstanding, Congress obviously, point blank, washed its hands of its commerce clause power when it enacted the controlled substance offenses set out in Chapter 13. For when Congress admits/declares that it is unable to distinguish between interstate commerce and intrastate commerce in terms of control (that is its enacted statutes), it is telling the Executive Branch and the Judiciary that the impact on interstate commerce must be decided on a case by case basis relative to interstate commerce if Congress in fact expected Chapter 13 offenses to be enforced outside the territory over which it possesses exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
Second, it must be noted that Chapter 13, The Controlled Substance Act of 1970 was an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which was an amendment to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. In the Pure Food and Drug Act, Congress redefined interstate commerce to be confined to the territory over which it has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
“The term ‘interstate commerce’ means (1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any other Territory not organized with a legislative body.”
21 D.S.C. 321(b)
While Congress, as aforesaid, is not at liberty to redefine a term used in the Constitution, especially when it has a direct bearing on an enumerated power, such as “interstate commerce,” it is, of course, at liberty to do so when legislating under its grant of power to exclusively legislate within its sovereign territorial jurisdiction. A reading of the redefinition of the term “State” will make it more than obvious that Congress did not in fact call upon its commerce clause power when enacting the drug laws, but instead, indeed, and in fact redefined “interstate commerce” to be solely within its own sovereign territory.
“The term ‘State,”… means any State or Territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” 21 U.S.C. 321(a)(1)
Remembering that a “State of the United States” is not one of the States of the Union but a State within the sovereign territory of the United States, by substituting the above definition for State in the redefinition of “interstate commerce,” it then becomes intuitively obvious that the above redefinition of “interstate commerce” clearly relates only to commerce within the sovereign territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
At the risk of being redundant, the word state refers to the representative government of a territory. For example, New York is the territory; the state of New York is the representative government of the people of New York domiciled within its territorial boundaries. Likewise, the State of New York is said to have exclusive legislative jurisdiction within the territorial boundaries of New York. The men who attended the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia were representatives from their respective state governments and were therefore representing the State of New York, etc.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “State” as:
“1. The system of rules by which jurisdiction and authority are exercised over a political organized body of people; the political organization or the body of people itself.
2. An institution of self government within a larger political entity.” Blacks Law Dictionary, Pocket Ed. (2000)
Since the States of the Union and the United States enjoy a mutually exclusive sovereignty, the State of New York, for example, while it is “an institution of self government” it is not “within a larger political entity.” Therefore, the States of the Union are not States of the United States, no matter how many angels dance on the head of a pin.
Notice also that the term States of the Union refer to peer states in a Union of States, and, as aforesaid, is not within a larger political entity, while a State of the United States is.
To demonstrate that Congress knows how to include the States of the Union in its redefinitions of the term “State,” consider following nearly identical redefinitions at 7 U.S.C. §§2009 and 2012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 618 and 619:
“The term ‘State’ means each of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands of the United States, American Somoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianna Islands, or the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.”
“Each of the 50 States” are not “States of the United States,” but the remaining of the entities above listed are.
Furthermore, the fact that Congress knows how to include the 50 independent States in its drug legislation is verified at 21 U.S.C. 1007, to wit:
“The term ‘State’ includes, in addition to the several States of the Union, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, …. ” 21 U.S.C. 1007
Therefore, when Congress decided to get into the “drug and cosmetic” regulation business in 1906, it was well aware that such legislation was authorized under its delegated power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution which is the power of exclusive legislative jurisdiction within its sovereign territory. Even when using the term “interstate commerce,” Congress limited such commerce to be solely within its own sovereign territory or commerce going between territory within its exclusive jurisdiction and without. In either case, the commerce must by Congress’ own definition of “interstate commerce” go through the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. But drug commerce between any States of the Union that don’t glaze federal territory is not actionable in the District Courts. So when Congress declared in 21 U.S.C. 801(5) that it “was not feasible in terms of control (legislation)” to distinguish between interstate and intrastate drug commerce it was due to the fact that Congress’ own redefinition of “interstate commerce” contained both concepts of interstate and intrastate commerce therein.
While Congress redefined “interstate commerce” in many chapters and sections within Title 18, it throw a blanket definition over the entire title at 18 USC §10. To wit:
Ҥ10 Interstate commerce and foreign commerce defined.
The term ‘interstate commerce,’ as used in this title, includes commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or District of Columbia. (emphasis added)
The term ‘foreign commerce’ as used in this title, includes commerce with a foreign country.”
The first thing to notice is that this redefinition of the term interstate commerce applies to the whole of Title 18 unless it is again redefined in an applicable statute as it has been
in section 921. In Congress’ “plug and play” definitions of terms, whenever we run into a redefinition for the term State, it thus must be plugged into the foregoing definition using the term to fully understand the original definition. While the term State is not redefined for Section 10, it is known by the company it keeps as a “State of the United States”, and by the simple fact that Congress is redefining a term of power found in the Constitution, dictating the Section 10 has application only within the territory over which Congress has been granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
Take section 1030, for another example, where Congress at 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(3) redefines state:
“(3) the term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession or territory of the United States.”
Looking back to the redefinition of interstate commerce at section 10, while the redefinition of the term “State” from 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(3) plugged into 18 U.S.C. §10 creates some textural redundancy, it, nonetheless, limits interstate commerce to that which occurs between political subdivisions within the federal territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction as granted by the Constitution.
This is all consistent with Rule 54, the fact that the United States District Courts are territorial Tribunals, and the fact that in order to adjudicate a cause of action under Congress’ commerce clause power would require it be commenced in an Article III Tribunal, and establishes even further that Congress’ redefinition of “interstate Commerce” must, as a matter of law, be confined to territory over which it has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Consequently, because Congress cannot possibly redefine a term used in the Constitution which has a direct bearing on a delegated power therefrom, except when legislating within its sovereign territory, it is a first principle issue that when it chose to redefine the term like “interstate commerce,” State”, etal, it accordingly limited such legislation to be enforceable only within its own territory. Furthermore, the clear unambiguous wording of the redefinition itself restricts the term “interstate commerce” to the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Therefore, the Federal Government has no jurisdiction to enforce its drug laws under Title 21, Chapter 13 within the territorial boundaries of anyone of the several 50 States. So, even if an indictment had alleged an interstate commerce nexus for acts occurring in any one or more of the 50 States of the Union, it would have been superfluous since “interstate commerce” as it applies to Title 21, Chapter 13, is strictly commerce within the territorial boundaries over which Congress possesses exclusive legislative jurisdiction, and such territory does not include any territory over which one of the 50 States has exclusive legislative jurisdiction except when the commerce traffic travels through the territory over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction..
The same can be said for other federal legislation. Take for example the firearm statutes. For Title 18, Chapter 44 offenses (firearms), the limitations on the definitions of the terms “interstate commerce” and “State” and their associated jurisdictional restrictions on Chapter 44 offenses, are much clearer than they might be on Title 21, Chapter 13 offenses. Even though Congress throw a jurisdictional blanket over Title 18 offenses regarding interstate and foreign commerce at §10 it redefined “interstate commerce” in subsequent legislation for firearms.
At 18 USC §5, the definition for the “United States” as it applies to the entirety of Title 18 is nearly identical to the definition of that term for Title 21, Chapter 13 offenses, namely:
“The term “United States,” as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, except the Canal Zone. 18 U.S.C. 5 (emphasis added)
Here again, we see Congress limiting the definition of the “United States” in the entirety of Title 18 to the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction “unless a contrary intent appears” in the alleged offended statute. See Foley Brothers, supra, infra , .. at p. 5. It remains to be shown whether Congress intended for Chapter 44 offenses to be prosecuted outside of its territory under its commerce clause power or not. Looking at the redefinition for the term “interstate commerce” together with the redefinition for the term “State, at Section 921, it becomes semantically and linguistically obvious that Congress had no contrary intent for Chapter 44 offenses to be prosecuted beyond the territory over which it has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
“The term “interstate commerce” includes commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State. The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone).
In fact and in law, Congress’ redefinition of the term “interstate commerce” specifically limits the scope of Chapter 44 offenses to the territory over which it has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Consequently, even if the prosecution attempts to allege federal jurisdiction through an “interstate commerce” allegation, Congress has trapped such an allegation to be applicable only within the federal sovereign territory. Consequently, before any presumptions can be made relative to federal jurisdiction for the prosecution of criminal offenses, one must research Congress’ redefinitions of various jurisdictional terms, such as “State,” “interstate commerce,” etc., before any conclusive presumptions relative to jurisdiction can be made.
Therefore, all conclusions drawn in the foregoing discussion also apply to all Title 18, Chapter 44 offenses, and any references to term State within statutes defining an offense, do not include acts or conduct committed within anyone of the fifty (50) States, but is, by definition, limited to the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. This line of reasoning, by legal necessity carries over and likewise applies to the term “prohibited person.” A person who has committed an offense in anyone of the fifty (50) States does not become a “prohibited person” under the law in order to provide the Justice Department with a jurisdictional element for the express purpose of allowing the prosecutor to make an end run around the Constitution and Congress’ intent.
However, an interesting conflict of law arises when a statute does actually convey Congress’ intent to call on its commerce clause powers, such as in “mail fraud” and “wire fraud,” 18 USC. §§ 1341 and 1343. Such statutes, it will be noted, are in conflict with the “gate keeping” effects of Rule 54. Remember, pursuant to 28 U.D.C. 2072, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure trump statutes in conflict thereto, and rule 54 limits the scope of “acts of Congress,” statutes, to territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. How such a conflict will be resolved in the courts remains to be seen. The courts need to be presented with the argument before any resolution of this conflict can occur. Perhaps the argument centers around the fact that the United States, as a corporation dealing in commercial paper, is bound by the Clearfield Doctrine, that the “United States does business on business terms.” This limits the scope of its private corporate law to the territory over which it has the capacity under its corporate charter to establish commercial contracts with penal provisions under admiralty law. There has to be some reason for the presence of the President’s flag (Commander in Chief, an executive officer) and symbolic oars in the federal court rooms.
Admittedly, there a lot more questions than answers, but we need to formulate the questions before we are able to seek answers. Even then, there is no guarantee that the struggle to return to individual sovereignty will be realized but be advised and warned at the outset that liberty can only be enjoyed through eternal vigilance. Here’s to our future.
Furthermore, since only an Article III court possesses the Constitutional power to litigate a cause of action under Congress’ commerce power within the several 50 States, the United States District Court, consistent with the fact that it is solely a territorial Tribunal together with the “gate keeping” provisions of F.R.Cr.P. Rule 54 confining the United States District Courts to the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction, could not and therefore did not possess the power to litigate a cause of action in the State of Any one of the 50 States under Congress’ commerce clause power.
Therefore, interstate commerce does not provide a federal cause of action upon which relief could be granted in the case of either drug violations or firearm issues where the acts or activity allegedly violating federal law occurred outside the territory over which Congress was granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The lesson to be learned here is that things are not very often what they seem in federal statutes. One must read a statute in its entirety including all the definitions dealing with the subject matter of any given chapter. It is in the definitions that one will find the key elements of federal jurisdiction. There are those who would propose a Constitutional Amendment to limit the range and scope of “interstate commerce” to the range and scope of the original understanding of the framers of the Constitution. It is this author’s opinion that upon a thorough inspection of the statutes exercising control over interstate commerce, one will find that Congress has limited such power to the territory over which it has exclusive control and no such amendment would be meaningful or appropriate. In any case, any legislation which is overbroad in the use of Congress’ interstate commerce power is throttled by F.R.C.P. Rule 54. Congress has done its job. It has written the law to stay within its own cocoon of power. It is the executive and the judicial branches which refuse to follow it but instead execute federal law when and where the individual Justice Department employees and Judges see fit. Thus, when individual government agents refuse to stay within the law we no longer have the rule of law, we degenerate to the rule of men.
VI – PERSON
In many cases, the U. S. Attorneys attempt to use the definition of the term “person” to establish federal jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions. However, an analysis of the term “person” in federal legislation will soon reveal that such an attempt by federal prosecutors itself borders on criminal behavior. For example, in the Food and Drug Acts and subsequent amendments, the “term ‘person’ includes, individual, partnership, corporation, and association.” Taking into account that an individual “may, in proper cases, include artificial persons,” (Quoted form Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. page 773.) all the terms included in the definition of the term “person” are artificial non-human entities. Knowing a thing is characterized by the company it keeps, the definition of the term person in Title 21, Chapter 13, appears to relate to only artificial entities. Looking further, Blacks Law Dictionary defines the term “person” as:
“1. A Human being. 2. An entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having rights and duties of a human being. 3. The living body of a human being.
‘So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as· capable of rights and duties. Any being that is so capable is a person, whether a human being or not, and no being that is not so capable is a person, even though he be a man.
Persons are the substance of which rights and duties are the attributes. It is only in this respect that persons possess juridical significance, and this is the exclusive point of view from which personality receives legal recognition.’ John Salmond Jurisprudence 318 (Glanville C.Williams, 10th ed 1947)”
To reiterate, the exclusive point of view is that rights and duties are the attributes of a person in order for the being/person to receive any legal recognition. Rights and duties flow from contracts, whether they be the creation of the person, such as a corporation, or simply an agreement/contract between two or more persons, whether real or artificial. Therefore, all persons referred to in the statutes must possess the attributes of rights and duties, and thus must be a party to some contract or agreement with an agency of the government from which such rights and duties flow.
However, the record is usually, in federal cases, void of any pleading that a defendant is involved in any contract or agreement with government or the Plaintiff, the United States, from which there might flow any rights or duties beyond the duties of the Plaintiff to protect the defendant’s inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as an emancipated human being. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall (U.S.) 419, 454, 1 L.Ed440 (1793) (”at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects … and have none to govern but themselves”) Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Sheriff, ,118 ,U.S. 356 (”Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to the law, for it is the author of the law, but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”) Hale v. Henkle, 201 u.s. 43, 50 L.Ed 652, 26 S.Ct. 370 (1906) (”He owes no such duty to the state since he receives nothing therefrom.”) Consequently, unless the record provides evidence that the defendant was a person recognizable by the federal statutes alleged to have been violated in an indictment, the federal courts have no power to proceed.
Notwithstanding the absence of any contract/agreement/license creating the ens legis and conferring rights and duties thereto, the question also exists as to how and/or under what contract/ agreement/license did a criminal defendant become surety for this artificial entity designated by the representation of an all capital letters name arranged in the same sequence as the letters in the defendant’s proper name? Now the primary question becomes, in what evidence exists in the record of any contract/agreement/license making the defendant liable for any ens legis alter ego, strawman, person in which duties are one of its attributes? It must therefore be presumed that no such contract/agreement/license exists the is no legitimate cause of action nor any valid claim upon which relief can be granted. For if there is such an adhesion contract/agreement/license which imposes unspecified duties upon the person of the defendant through an ens legis transmitting utility, the government is required under the Clearfield Trust Doctrine (Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S 363-371 (1942)) to produce the document which establishes that the government corporation is the Holder in Due Course of some valid voluntary contract or commercial agreement binding the defendant to the specific performance or surety for said ens legis. Otherwise, the government corporation, the United States, by an through its probable transmitting utility, the United States of America, is attempting to enslave or subjugate such persons as the defendant by granting rights and duties in an ens legis being identified by all capital letters name arranged in the same order as the defendant’s proper name by legislative, executive, and judicial fiat. While secret and unpublished in the record, this represents involuntary servitude which is strictly prohibited by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.
Therefore, to secretly create some artificial entity with an ens legis in all capital letters arranged in the same sequence as a defendant’s proper name for the purpose of creating a transmitting utility as a means of enslaving such person to be a subject slave of or to the bankrupt United States for the express purpose of servicing said debt is patently unContitutional, unless the record has revealed some corporate contract/agreement/ license to show that the defendant knowingly and willingly in propria persona agreed to the creation of said artificial entity/ strawman for said purposes.
Since the record usually evidences the existence of no such contract/ agreement/license, the ultimate jurisdictional question arises; which is, was the human being, the defendant, sitting at the defense table the same person named on the indictment or was the person named on the indictment merely a transmitting utility using the defendant’s proper name in all capital letters to cunningly coerce the defendant into accepting the debt of said ens legis/transmitting utility thereby unConstitutionally enslaving him? Therefore, if the person named on the indictment is an ens legis and therefore not the same person as the defendant in propia persona, and the record contains no documentary evidence of any nexus between the defendant and said ens legis, the indictment has failed to make a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the judgment, if the defendant is deemed to be guilty, is void and the Court must grant Writ of Error and immediately restore the defendant’s rights to Liberty.
On the other hand, if the person named on the indictment is an ens legis and therefore not the same person as the defendant in propia persona and said ens legis is being used as a transmitting utility to involuntarily enslave the defendant in propia persona for whatever purpose, said involuntary enslavement is unConstitutional making any proceedings dependent thereto a fraud rendering the proceedings void for fraud and a violation of the defendant’s inalienable right to Liberty. Accordingly, the judgment is void for fraud and the Court must grant a Writ of Error and immediately restore the defendant’s rights to Liberty .
While the government actors may have created an artificial/legal fiction entity identified by the defendant’s proper name in all capital letters as a “vessel” in order to proceed in admiralty, it is of no consequence for, as aforesaid, there is no Constitutional authority for territorial Tribunals, in this case the United States District Court, to take jurisdiction to adjudicate any case under maritime or admiralty law for acts or conduct committed within the territorial boundaries of anyone of the 50 States. See infra, page 11 & 12. Consequently, admiralty cannot serve as a lawful basis for the proceeding in the United States District Court in such a case and the judgment remains void for all the above argued reasons and this Court must dismiss all charges and restore a defendant’s inaleinable right to Liberty.
VII – PRINCIPAL OF INTEREST
All Criminal actions are brought in the United States District Court in the name of the United States of America. However, Congress has never legislated that a cause of action of any kind can be brought in the name of the “United States of America” nor has Congress defined or legislatively created such an entity as the “United States of America.”
In the Revised Statutes of 1878, Section 919, Congress legislated that:
“All suits for recovery of any duties, imports, or taxes, … , and all suits arising under the postal laws, shall be brought in the name of the United States.” (emphasis added)
This same Principal carries all the way to the present day legislation. The 1994 edition of Title 28 , Section 566(c) is just one example:
“(c) Except as otherwise provided by law or Rule of Procedure, the United States Marshals Service shall execute all lawful writs, process, and orders issued under authority of the United States …. ”
Nowhere is there Constitutional or statutory authority for the “United States of America” to serve as principal of interest in civil or criminal causes of action in any of the States of the Union. A knee jerk response might be that the “United States” and the “United States of America” are one in the same, but such is not the case. Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations is just one of many examples that provide conclusive proof that the two are unique entities. The reader will notice that 28 CFR O.96b clearly distinguishes one from the other.
Even 18 USC 3231 specifies original jurisdiction only “for offenses against the laws of the United States,” not the “United States of America.”
So how does the “United States of America” become the party to the action or Principal of Interest in criminal and civil proceedings against an accused person. Is the “United States of America” simply a legal fiction entity, created for the sole purpose to function as a transmitting utility for the United States due to the fact that the United States has declared bankruptcy, since a bankrupt corporation has no standing at law? (See House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933) Whether so or not, this issue should be raised at the outset of any commenced action because the “United States of America” has no Constitutional or legislated authority to bring a cause of action against anyone under the laws of the United States, whether in equity, common law, or admiralty. Consequently, all federal courts are duty bound to dismiss the action for failure of the U.S. Attorney to establish lawful standing to state a claim before the court.
VIII – ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
In Lopez, supra, Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion spoke of the concept of deciding cases based on the original understanding of the Constitution by those who framed and ratified it and how far our jurisprudence has deviated from that original understanding with respect to interstate commerce. Justice Robert H. Bork, in his book The Tempting of America, The Political Seduction of the Law,” 1st Touchstone ed. 1990, used the concept of original understanding as his central theme.
However, both Justice Thomas and Justice Bork lamented that to return our jurisprudence to such a basic and crisp purpose for our federal and State constitutions based on original understanding would be a political impossibility. There are certainly very few legal scholars who would disagree with such an assessment based on the impact of stare decisis on current day rulings. But such a negative reservation raises a couple of questions. First, by giving appointed judges tenure and undiminished salaries, wasn’t it the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to free the judiciary from all political pressures, or was their intent to design an appointment system to cause the judiciary to forever be beholding to the financial and political powers that made their lifetime appointment possible? Second, do our judges when appointed, take an oath to uphold the Constitution or do they swear to follow the path of stare decisis?
In 1818 the Supreme Court in Chisholm,. supra, the original understanding of the Constitution was recognized to be, that both the people and the states were sovereign and the offices of government were the servants of the people. Today, the federal servants take the position of sovereign and the people and the states are reduced to serfs on the land. The people pay an ever increasing percentage of their productivity to support the ever increasing aristocracy required to manage and control the ever increasing despotic bureaucracy’s deviation from the original understanding of the Constitution.
The Constitution commands Congress to provide each state with a Republican Form of government, yet the federal oligarchy propagandizes that the United States is a Democracy. (This may be true in fact in the sense that Congress through its exclusive legislative power over its own sovereign soil has indeed created a Democracy rather than a Republic: quite possibly an oversight on the part of the Framers.) And the people of the States believe it to be true also in their own territory. Justice Bork wrote “Constitutional jurisprudence is mysterious terrain for most people, who have more pressing things to think about. And a very handy fact that is for the revisionist.” Tempting, supra, at 17. And so it is.
One should also notice that nowhere in this paper do we challenge the Constitutionality of any of Congress’ legislation. In fact, quite the contrary, on all occasions it is pointed out that Congress has in fact prevented the laws used as a claim against most defendants from being enforced within the sovereign territory of anyone of the 50 States, either by statute or by the “gate keeping” effects of Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, all fully within the principles of original understanding of the Framers and ratifiers of the federal and State Constitutions.
In their original understanding the Framers established a dual sovereignty between the States of the Union and the newly created United States. The above arguments show that with respect to Title 21, Chapter 13 drug offenses and firearm statutes (as well as other not referenced here) Congress did not in any way infringe upon that dual sovereignty. However, we witness the everyday process of the Executive branch through the Attorney General’s office and the Judiciary through the District Courts arrogantly practicing federal law within the sovereign 50 states. While Congress may have been able to call on its commerce clause power, it chose not to by redefining interstate commerce to be commerce solely within the territory over which Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. To further hold the line on the concept of dual sovereignty within the notion of original understanding, Congress and the Supreme Court created the territorial gate keeping function by the supersession phrase in 28 USC 2072(b) combined with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, in spite of and contrary to the clear guiding light of Congress’ legislation and the original understanding of the Constitution, the Justice (sic) Departrment and the United States District Courts take the revisionist view that the sovereign territory of Any one of the 50 States could be construed to be territory over which the laws of the United States could be prosecuted in a strictly territorial Tribunal, namely the United States District Court. Furthermore, for or under whatever revisionist pretext, the Justice Department seems to be able to get the Judge of said territorial Tribunal to recognize the “United States of America” rather than the “United States” as the principal of interest, contrary to any legislation or Constitutional authority allowing it.
The Supreme Court recognized early on that only Congress has the power to punish:
“The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is, perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, not in the judicial department.” [or the Executive through its Justice Department] United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat (U.S.) 76, 95, 5L.Ed 37, 46
When the United States District Court (USDC), a territorial Tribunal takes cognizance of a cause of action outside its territorial jurisdiction, when said USDC takes cognizance of a cause of action over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction, when said USDC ignores the Gate Keeping provisions of Rule 54, of the F.R.Cr.P., when said USDC ignores the limited scope of “interstate commerce” redefined by Congress for Title 21 legislation, when said USDC quite possibly takes judicial notice of the secret fact that a defendant is an ens legis using all capital letters in the same or similar sequence of this Petitioner’s name, and when said USDC recognizes the “United States of America” as the principal of interest in a criminal proceeding, said USDC is in all cases usurping the power of Congress to punish and, through its judicial power, is revising the very laws it was empowered to adjudicate to be what it felt the laws should be, not what they in fact really are.
It is against this practice of judicial legislation (judicial revisions of the law) that Appeals Courts and he Supreme Court should resolutely set their face. Otherwise, history will simply record that this great system of human sovereignty of the people in due time reverted right back to the very same feudal system, albeit much more centralized and controlled by a much larger corporate despotic oligarchy/aristocracy, from whence we gained our independence from in the first place.
Accordingly, upon the foregoing, the body of Judges in the federal court system need to obey Congress’ laws and ignore Stare Decisis when it conflicts with the clear language of Congress’ statutes and/or the Constitution in an conscientious effort to restore a modicum of strict judicial integrity to the Federal Court system by refusing to entertain an action absent a clear and accurate jurisdictional pleading based in law when the cause of action is based solely on actions occurring within the territorial boundaries of one or more of the 50 states of the Union. Such action must be ruled coram non judice at the federal level thus allowing the sovereign states to run their own affairs. When a federal court entertains a cause of action which Constitutionally should be resolved in the State courts, it is no different than if the Department of Justice attempted to enforce federal law in the District Courts for activity occurring is say Sweden.
CONCLUSION
In a most recent case, Justice Thomas in writing for the majority in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports· Authority, __ U.S. __ (F.M.C.), decided May 28, 2002, wrote:
“Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our nation’s constitutional blueprint. States, upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the federal government. Rather, they entered the union ‘with their sovereignty intact. ‘If
The blueprint of the concept of dual but mutual sovereignties is precisely what has been argued above.
What was most interesting about this case was the wide disparity between the majority and the minority opinions relative to this issue of dual sovereignty and the fact that they are in fact mutually exclusive, except in rare specific circumstances. This pivotal issue surfaced loud and clear in both Justice Thomas’ opinion for the Court and Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion. The latter of which unmasks the thesis upon which the revisionists have used over the years to revise our Constitution. This revisionism has plagued the jurisprudence of this County since at lease the New Deal era. The point of contention among the legal professionals rests on the intent of the Framers as to whether the Federal Government, the United States, is constrained strictly to those powers delegated in the Constitution or whether the Federal Government is free to exercise the “required flexibility” it deems necessary to “keep up with the times” so long as such necessity does not include something prohibited” by the Constitution. In other words, the debate is whether the Federal Government has enumerated powers or enumerated prohibitions. The real problem is that the Federal Government in fact has both. With respect to the States, it has enumerated powers, but with respect to its own sovereignty within its own territory, it has enumerated prohibitions, both in the body of the Constitution and in the first ten (10) amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, which should more aptly be viewed as a Bill of Prohibitions. But, be that as it may, James Madison in the Federalist Papers only wrote of enumerated powers. See infra., page 1.
The fact that Justice Breyer and the minority, not unlike other Constitutional Revisionists, believes that the federal Constitution did not bind down the Federal Government can be found in their statement that the “majority rejected the ‘basic understanding’ reached during the New Deal era that the constitutional system requires ’structural flexibility sufficient to adapt substantive laws and institutions to rapidly changing social, economic, and technical conditions.’” Was this “basic understanding’ reached during the New Deal era” a result of the bankruptcy of the United States providing an excuse for expanding the sphere and scope of the federal government, or does the Minority really believe, as they wrote in F.M.C., that “the Constitution created a federal government empowered to enact .laws that would bind the states, and it empowered that federal government to enforce those laws against the states?” Where they find evidence of this belief is unexplained. In the Minority’s view, the New Deal ushered in unconstrained Federal powers to do whatever it takes to adapt substantive laws and institutions to rapidly changing social, economic, and technical conditions. If this “walks, talks, and squawks very much like” unlimited power, perhaps the proof lies in what has transpired in the thirty (30) years between the New Deal era and the Vietnam War era where the Federal Budget ballooned to nearly one third (1/3), about thirty (30) percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), when, at the turn of the 19th Century, (1900), it was less than one percent (1%) of the GNP.
Since we have seen that Congress has stayed within its Constitutional authority and the word “adapt” means to make fit as for a new use or for different circumstances, this author would read the phrase “structural flexibility sufficient to adapt substantive laws and institutions to rapidly changing social, economic, and technical conditions” to suggest that Justice Breyer desires to legislate on the fly from the bench. That way he would have the opportunity to reshape the law as he sees fit and rule on the matter before the Court using his new customized law. Me tinks that Justice Breyer has just found a way to transform judges into kings.
History has witnessed far too many cases having been decided on the same premise that Justice Breyer and the minority espouses, namely, that if something is not prohibited by the Constitution, the Federal Government, through all three branches, is free to perform any function and pass any laws not so prohibited. While this is certainly true in its own sovereign territory, as aforesaid, it is certainly is not true within the sovereign territory of anyone of the several fifty (50) states, party to the Union of States. A simple reading of the 9th and 10th Amendments should be enough to set the record straight for any intellectual on .this issue, leaving no room for debate; any and all New Deal influences to the contrary notwithstanding.
Constitutional revisionists would do well to digest Justice Thomas’ concluding statement:
“While some might complain that our system of dual sovereignty is not a model of administrative convenience, that is not its purpose, Rather, the ‘Constitutionally mandated balance of power’ between the states and the federal government was adopted by the framers to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’ By guarding against encroachments by the federal government on fundamental aspects of state sovereignty … , we strive to maintain the balance of power embodied in our Constitution and thus ‘reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. ‘” Id.
When the Supreme Court is ready to apply the same simple principle to the federal drug and firearm laws together with all other Sovereign State business in the very manner in which Congress has explicitly legislated them, as above argued, we will begin to return our federal jurisprudence to the “yellow brick road” to individual sovereignty and liberty.
To this end, while rebuttable
“‘the presumption … is that the court below was without jurisdiction’ unless ‘the contrary intent appears affirmatively from the record.’ King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 170 U.S. 225, 226 … (1887)” Bender v. Williamsport
Area School dist., 475 U.S. 534(1986)’
However, in the usual case, the record, including indictments, is grossly inadequate to rebut the presumption that the District Court’s jurisdiction to charge, try, convict, and sentence a defendant does not exist. Consequently, the one and only remedy remaining to the government to prevent the presumption that the court below was without jurisdiction from becoming a conclusive presumption would be for the government to bring forth the “document of acceptance of jurisdiction” over the lands upon which the wrongful acts and/or conduct was alleged to have occurred, as per 40 U.S.C. 255 (now Section 3112). See Adams v. U.S., 319 U.S. 312-316 (1943). Absent such a document of acceptance of jurisdiction by the federal government, the hearing Court is duty bound to dismiss the action or deem the judgment void and immediately restore a defendant’s right to Liberty.
Jurisdiction is the first principle issue in all federal suits, both criminal and civil. As aforesaid, if the Justice Department in concert with the District Courts refuse to stay within the law as Congress has written it, the rule of law has been lost and we in the 50 States are now being ruled by a privileged class of men.
Thanks Bob for your constructive critiques.
I apologize for “jurisdiction” being misspelled. Unfortunately, I rely on the notion that if you can’t trust Word for spell checking, who can you trust?
Because federal law when using the term “state” in a statute doesn’t differentiate between the 50 Union States and the huge body of federal states, I purposely designate the former as Union States to remove any doubt as to which jurisdictional “state” I am referring.
You will, however, find somewhere in the huge body of federal statutes inconspicuously placed a definition of the term “State” which, more often than not, doesn’t include any one of the Union States in that definition.
Cheers,
clyde@poorclydesalmanac.info